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I. INTRODUCTION
The dawn of the twenty-first century brought with it a profound change in the
way we experience death. Until the last decades of the twentieth century, our bodies
died all at once: when the heart, kidneys, lungs, or brain failed, the body’s other
organs failed with them. Modern medicine now allows us to die in pieces, with
failing organs supported or supplanted by technology.1
Modern death is different not only biologically, but also sociologically. Until the
twentieth century, death was a private event that took place in the home with the
family.2 It offered one final opportunity for family members and friends to engage
with loving care, to forgive and ask forgiveness, and to relive life events, great and
small.3 Today, death takes place mostly in the hospital, in sterile rooms full of
expensive machinery, with patients who are drugged, unconscious, hooked up to
machines and unable to speak—even if their bodies were still capable of doing so.
*
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1
See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
(1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION]. This phenomenon was first commented upon
in this report. Id.
2
See id. at 17 (“For most of recorded history . . . the ‘deathbed’ was a real place, and the
dying person usually knew where he was and when it was time to assemble the family and call
for the priest. . . . ”).
3

Our literature is replete with deathbed scenes of dying with family, beginning with the
Biblical Jacob’s deathbed blessings of his children. Genesis 49:1. More recently, news
reports of Jacquelyn Kennedy Onassis’s leaving the hospital in order to die with her family
served to highlight that it has now become exceptional and newsworthy when individuals are
able to die at home with their families. See, e.g., Janny Scott, Death of a First Lady: A Death
at Home, Among Family and Friends, and Even Strangers, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at B10.
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Doctors, lawyers, nurses, social workers, ethicists, and family members enter a
complex dynamic as treatment decisions are made for the unconscious patient, and
therapies are applied or refused.4
Approximately every ten years,5 a high-profile legal dispute emerges. These
disputes pit families, doctors, and elected officials against each other as they seek to
resolve ultimate questions of when life ends and death begins.6 These issues include
questions of whether suffering and pain may justify the termination of patient
treatment; whether actively terminating a human life is ever acceptable;7 and whether
anyone can determine the proper role of individual autonomy when it conflicts with
community values.8
While the debates ebb and flow, millions of ordinary families are forced to
confront these issues quietly on their own.9 Unfortunately, current policies
governing end-of-life decision-making fail these families in the most fundamental
ways and fail to achieve their most basic objectives.
In the thirty years since the seminal In re Quinlan case, personal autonomy has
been universally acknowledged as the most important value in the end-of-life
process.10 A consensus has emerged that decisions at the end-of-life are the type of
personal, individual choices that can only be made by the affected individual in a

4

See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 17-18.
As medicine has been able to do more for dying patients, their care has increasingly
been delivered in institutional settings. By 1949, institutions were the sites of 50% of
all deaths; by 1958, the figure was 61%; and by 1977, over 70%. Perhaps 80% of all
deaths in the United States now occur in hospitals and long-term care institutions, such
as nursing homes. . . . But people who are dying may well find such a setting
alienating and unsupportive.
Id. (quoting Lewis Thomas, Dying as Failure, 447 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 3
(1980)).
5
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
(N.J. 1976); Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
6
A decade or more separated Cruzan (Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990)), Quinlan (In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)), and Schiavo (Schindler v.
Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)), each of which garnered widespread
national publicity. Many other important decisions were issued along the way. See, e.g.,
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 347 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
7

See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647.

8

See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 805 (1997); Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997).
9
More than fifteen years ago, an analysis showed that 7000 legal proceedings had been
brought to adjudicate end-of-life decisions. Diane E. Hoffman, Mediating Life and Death
Decisions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 821 n.1 (1994). These cases, however, represent only the small
tip of a large iceberg. In light of the statistics in the article by Hoffman, it is hard to imagine a
family in the United States that has not been touched by this issue. Id. at n.3.
10

See Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (1999). See also the discussion at Part II, infra, in which the
Quinlan, Cruzan, and Schiavo courts all agree that personal autonomy would be a compelling
basis for allowing patients to make end-of-life decisions.
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pluralistic society such as our own.11 However, while paying lip service to the value
of personal autonomy, courts and legislatures have in fact been imposing their own
values and those of family members and close personal friends on the dying process.
As a result, dying patients rarely take true control over the decisions in their own
dying process.
While the modern process of dying fails to protect the autonomy of dying
patients, it affirmatively places an exceptional and unfair burden on their family
members. When they face shock, grief, pain, and uncertainty, family members are
often called upon to make profound life-and-death decisions that they have no desire
or competence to make, and they must typically make them in a foreign environment
and on a moment’s notice.12
Considering that physicians are integrally involved in end-of-life decisions, this
article discusses a new paradigm that would place on physicians the responsibility to
elicit from their patients the moral guidelines that would govern end-of-life decisionmaking. In the event a patient later became incapacitated, the physician would be
responsible to apply these moral guidelines to actual treatment decisions. Part II of
this article examines the central role that the ethic of personal autonomy plays in
end-of-life decision-making. Part III describes how the courts have conceptually
validated that ethic, while ignoring it in practice, by looking at the three seminal endof-life court decisions of the past thirty years. Part IV examines legislative solutions
to end-of-life decision-making and highlight their failings. Finally, Part V looks at a
new paradigm for end-of-life decision-making, one centered on the doctor-patient
relationship.
II. AUTONOMY IN END-OF-LIFE DECISION-MAKING
Generally, two competing theories seek to explain ethical decision-making in the
modern era. The first, whose principal proponent was Immanuel Kant, relies on
autonomy, which is the person’s right to govern himself.13 The second relies on
utilitarianism, which requires a decision that achieves the best result for society.14
Once the right of autonomy is granted, an individual has a concomitant
responsibility to exercise it in a morally correct fashion, as perceived by the
individual.15 Respect for personal autonomy requires letting the person make
decisions for and by himself, no matter how foolish those decisions may be.16 This

11

See Meisel, supra note 10, at 1397.

12

One solution would be to apply a “therapeutic justice” analysis to the current law
governing end-of-life decision-making, attaching a central role to the real world sociological
effects of current policies. Mary Beth Morrissey & Bruce Jennings, A Social Ecology of
Health Model in End-of-Life Decision-Making: Is the Law Therapeutic?, 11 N.Y. ST. B.
ASS’N HEALTH L.J. 51 (2006).
13

IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS
Beck trans. 1959) (1785).

ON THE

METAPHYSICS

OF

MORALS 59-67 (Lewis W.

14

See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 3-19 (Currin V. Shields eds. 1956) (1859).

15

KANT, supra note 13, at 59-67.

16

MILL, supra note 14, at 9, 104.
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value is enshrined explicitly and implicitly in the Declaration of Independence17 and
the Bill of Rights.18 In the context of end-of-life decisions, autonomy means that
individuals have the right and duty to make ethical treatment decisions for
themselves.19
Utilitarianism is a competing source of ethical values. Utilitarianism seeks to
create the greatest good for the greatest number of people.20 In the context of end-oflife decision making, utilitarianism means that decisions should be made that are in
the best interest of society.
Defining best-interest in this context, however, requires that a standard be
determined as to what most benefits society. If the primary goal is to preserve scarce
medical resources, then one type of decision might be made; if the goal is to preserve
the sanctity of human life, then another type of decision might be made; if the goal is
to reduce human suffering, then still other choices exist. In end-of-life cases, states
frequently assert the sanctity of human life as a value that should be applied to endof-life decision-making.21
An important difference between autonomy and utilitarianism is that autonomy
stresses that the individual should make decisions, while utilitarianism focuses on the
quality of the decisions that are being made.22 These competing ethical theories form
the context in which important legal issues are debated and decided by the courts.
Thus, for example, a state might determine that the sanctity of human life is
sufficiently important that a patient’s treatment should never be terminated. This
utilitarian view might conflict with a particular patient’s own view that she has
suffered enough and that treatment should end. In that situation, the prevailing view
is that the personal autonomy should prevail; right or wrong, the decision is the

17

“We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal and endowed by
their creator with certain inalienable rights, including the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
18

U.S. CONST. amend. I-X. Whether under the rubric of the “right to privacy” or the Due
Process Clause’s prohibition on the denial of liberty without due process of law, courts have
concluded that respect for personal autonomy is enshrined in the Constitution. Compare
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (acknowledging the liberty interest
in directing one’s own treatment) with In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (relying on the
right to privacy enshrined in the penumbra of the Constitution).
19

BARRY R. FURROW
(5th ed. 2004).
20

ET AL.,

HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS

AND

PROBLEMS 1344-46

MILL, supra note 14, at 3-19.

21

See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d
551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
22

Cf. KANT, supra note 13; MILL, supra note 14.
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patient’s to make.23 Only when a patient’s view is unknown, should the state’s
utilitarian views be taken into account.24
Generally, personal autonomy is considered the most important ethical value
underlying end-of-life decision-making.25 The choice of personal autonomy as the
most important value in end-of-life decision-making means that ensuring an
appropriate process for decision-making is more important than ensuring that
decisions are “correct.”
In perhaps its broadest formulation, the United States Supreme Court described
this value in the following manner:
[M]atters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to liberty. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State.26
Jurists who do not endorse an all-encompassing “right of privacy” nevertheless
acknowledge that the constitutional liberty interest extends beyond freedom from
physical restraint and into matters of personal choice.27 These matters of personal
choice include a parent's right to send a child to private school, a right to teach a
foreign language in a parochial school, a right to marry, a right to procreate, and a
right to use contraceptives.28
But legal cases are not about abstract values. Such values, as a legal matter, may
be insufficient to trump utilitarian values identified by the state unless they are
expressed in some form of traditional and long-held right.29 Perhaps for that reason,
courts sometimes defend a person’s right to terminate treatment by reference to
bodily integrity.30

23

See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 803 n.8. A competent adult patient has the right to make his or
her own treatment decisions. However, some decisions may not be available to patients, as
nearly all states expressly disapprove of suicide and assisted suicide. Id. at 805. See also id.
at n.9. But, almost all other treatment and non-treatment choices are available as a matter of
personal autonomy. Id.
24

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.

25

See TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (Oxford
Univ. Press 2001) (1979); ALBERT JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH
TO ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (McGraw Hill 2002) (1982); Robert Swidler,
When a Patient’s Prior Decision Conflicts with a Family’s Current Insistence that Treatment
be Provided, 10 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N HEALTH L.J. 75 (2005).
26

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).

27

Id. at 951 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

28

Id.

29

Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (limiting the liberty interest protected by
the Constitution to “fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and traditions’”).
30

See id. at 725.
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Courts have long recognized that individuals have the right to bodily integrity,
which is the right to control the treatment of one’s own body. As Justice Cardozo
once described, “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body.” 31 Thus, he held that a patient
could properly make a claim in tort when her doctor surgically removed a fibroid
after she had consented only to a biopsy.32
By expressing a general moral value as a specific right to treatment, however, we
risk conflating two very different rights. Patients have a fundamental right to make
general, moral decisions about life and death. They have the right to say: “I do not
want to live like that,” “I want to fight to the end,” “I do not want to be a burden,” or
“I want to die at home.” The decisions are so personal that no one else is equipped
to make the decision.33
Patients also have the right to direct their own treatment. They have the right to
accept or refuse a dizzying array of treatments that may prolong or shorten their life,
increase or reduce their suffering, and interfere with or improve their enjoyment of
life. These decisions are not fundamental moral decisions about life and death, but
are treatment decisions that involve choices about how to express their moral views.
When patients are conscious and have decisional capacity, the right to make
moral decisions and the right to make decisions about bodily integrity are one and
the same. When patients lack decisional capacity, however, they may never have
contemplated their current medical condition. They may have moral views, fully
formed and expressed, but not medical views. In these situations, distinguishing
between the values of autonomy and of bodily integrity is critical. The value of
autonomy would require that treatment be consistent with the patient’s moral views.
The value of bodily integrity would require a hands-off approach unless the patient
has made specific treatment decisions. As described in the next section, the courts’
emphasis on bodily integrity rather than moral autonomy has complicated analysis of
end-of-life cases.

The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced from abstract
concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule that forced medication
was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history
and constitutional traditions.
Id. See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 (dividing liberty interests into two classes: those of
intimate relationships and those of bodily integrity, and placing end-of-life decisions squarely
in the category of bodily integrity).
31
32
33

Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.).
Id.

Even absent an argument based on the value of personal autonomy, the pluralistic nature
of our society compels the same result. A society that includes strict Catholics, liberal
Catholics, lapsed Catholics, Orthodox Jews, reform Jews, liberal Jews, evangelicals, atheists,
and secularists likely cannot reach any form of consensus on the issues implicated in end-oflife decisions.
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III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE: FALSE AUTONOMY
Courts have decided three seminal end-of-life cases in the last thirty years that
dealt with incapacitated patients who lacked decisional capacity.34 In each case, a
young woman lay comatose, kept alive by machines, with no hope of recovery.35 In
each case, a young woman had expressed some moral views about end-of-life
decisions, if only in general and vague terms.36 Also, in each case, the courts
proclaimed that individual autonomy would serve as the lynchpin of its decision.37
None of the three decisions, however, vindicated personal autonomy.38
Instead, all three cases turned on the utilitarian values of the deciding courts.
“Liberal” courts, which believe that the most important goal is to reduce human
suffering, sanctioned the termination of treatment. “Conservative” courts, which
believe that the most important goal is the sanctity of human life, upheld decisions to
continue treatment or, more technically, found that family members had produced
insufficient evidence to justify terminating treatment in the face of the State’s
competing interest in favor of continuing life. Legal commentators followed suit by
taking varying positions on whether and when treatment should be continued.39
However, in all three cases, the patient’s autonomy was ignored.40
In each of the three cases the the patient was left in a persistent vegetative state,
incapable of having awareness of anything around her.41 Karen Quinlan was twentytwo years old when, for reasons never fully explained, she stopped breathing.42
Nancy Cruzan was twenty-four when a car accident cut off blood flow to her brain.43
Theresa Schiavo was twenty-seven when she suffered cardiac arrest due to a
potassium imbalance.44
Their postures grew fetal-like and grotesque; their joints rigid and deformed.45
They were not dead, however, not by any definition of the term.46 While they could
34
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647
(N.J. 1976); Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
35

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

36

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

37

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

38

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

39
Norman L. Cantor, Déjà Vu All Over Again: The False Dichotomy Between Sanctity of
Life and Quality of Life (Rutgers Univ. (Newark) Legal Working Paper Series, Rutgers Law
Sch. (Newark) Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 22, 2005), available at http://law.
bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art22 (last visited June 2, 2007).
40

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

41

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

42

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647.

43

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.

44

Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

45

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

46

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.
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not “think” because they had no higher cognitive functions, their brain stems were
still alive and produced various reflexive motions.47
In each case, family members sought to terminate treatment and were opposed.48
All three courts said they would look to the patients to determine how treatment
would proceed.49 And, in each case the court ignored or supplemented the patient’s
expressed wishes, and someone other than the patient took responsibility for
determining the outcome.50
A. In re Quinlan
In re Quinlan was the first and most important case.51 After Karen had lapsed
into a vegetative state, her father, Joseph Quinlan, at first did everything possible to
keep Karen alive.52 Over time, however, he decided that Karen had suffered
enough.53 He was a devout Catholic, though, and turned to the Catholic Church for
guidance before determining a course of action.54 He discovered that the Catholic
Church did not require that extraordinary efforts be made to preserve life.55 Instead,
the Catholic Church held the view that the patient had the right to decide whether to
undertake such efforts, and if the patient was incompetent, the family must make that
decision.56
The Catholic Church advised Joseph Quinlan that his decision to discontinue
treatment was, according to the teachings of the Catholic Church, “a morally correct
decision.”57 Consequently, Joseph Quinlan asked Karen’s doctor to terminate
Karen’s life support.58 The doctor, however, concluded that ending life support
constituted a substantial deviation from medical tradition and involved ascertaining
“quality of life” and, thus, determined that he would not do so.59 Joseph Quinlan
then went to court, seeking an appointment as Karen’s guardian and the express
power to terminate treatment.60

47

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

48

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

49

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

50

See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647; Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 551.

51

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647.

52

In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 812-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).

53

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976).

54

Id. at 658.

55

Id.

56

Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 812-13.

57

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 659.

58

Id.

59

Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 812-13.

60

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 655.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Joseph Quinlan specific authority to
terminate treatment.61 The court acknowledged the responsibilities, rights, and duties
of no less than five competing interests, including those of the patient, her family,
her doctors, and the courts.62 It acknowledged that Karen had not specifically
decided that she wished to die.63 It also recognized that removal of the respirator
would not conform to medical practice.64 Nevertheless, the court held that Karen had
a right in her person to terminate treatment and that this right could be exercised by
her father.65
The court’s holding in Quinlan centered on the notion of personal autonomy. In
authorizing her father to terminate Karen’s treatment, the New Jersey Supreme Court
made clear that it sought to protect Karen Quinlan’s affirmative right to personal
autonomy.66 First, relying on the right to privacy said to exist within the penumbra
of the United States Constitution, the court ruled that Karen had the right to
terminate her own treatment.67 This holding was entirely consistent with the rules of
autonomy.
However, as the court observed, Karen could not make this decision for herself.68
She had previously expressed distaste for continuance of life by extraordinary means
in several conversations.69 Nevertheless, the court found that those conversations
were “remote and impersonal” and, therefore, could not be relied upon.70
Consequently, the court looked to two other sources to determine Karen’s will.
First, the court itself determined what it thought Karen would have decided.71 As the
court explained, it had “no doubt that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an
interval,” she would have decided to terminate treatment.72 Why “compel Karen to
endure the unendurable, only to vegetate for a few measurable months, with no
realistic possibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life?”73 The
court’s conclusion that it “knew” what Karen wanted effectively ignored her right to
autonomy.

61

Id. at 671.

62

Id. at 663.

63

Id. at 664.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 647.

67

Id. at 664.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.

72

Id.

73

Id. More dramatic instance of this reasoning was when the court applied the same test to
someone who had never been competent.
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Even worse, by appointing Karen’s father to be her guardian and deferring to his
wishes, it abandoned even the pretense that treatment was terminated to vindicate
Karen’s autonomy rights. Joseph Quinlan did not seek to terminate Karen’s life until
he knew that the action conformed to his own religious beliefs.74 If the Catholic
Church believed that terminating treatment was a sin, he probably would not have
done so. While Karen certainly has the right to rely on the views of the Catholic
Church in making a decision, it is not clear why her father had that right when
deciding on her behalf.
In sum, the Quinlan court agreed to terminate life support, not because of
Karen’s own beliefs, which it claimed it did not know, but because of the court’s
own belief system and in reliance on her father’s belief system.75 Whether or not the
decision was correct, it involved perhaps the ultimate betrayal of personal autonomy:
Karen’s family and the New Jersey Supreme Court made Karen’s decision for her
and did it in her name. The court’s failing in Quinlan can be traced to the absence of
any system for converting Karen’s moral vies into practical treatment decisions.
Absent such a mechanism, the court was forced to defer to Karen’s family.
B. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health
If the Quinlan court fabricated an “autonomous” decision on behalf of Karen
Quinlan, then the Cruzan court highlighted what might happen absent such a
fabrication. The facts of Cruzan were nearly identical to that of Quinlan. A young
woman had made statements to a housemate that she did not wish to live if she
would face life as a vegetable.76 After the hospital treating Nancy Cruzan refused to
end life sustaining treatment at the parent’s request, her parents sought a court order
to make them do so.77 The primary difference between Nancy Cruzan and Karen
Quinlan was the location in which each took ill. Karen lived in a state whose
supreme court was willing to fabricate an autonomous decision on her behalf.78
Nancy Cruzan lived in a state whose supreme court was unwilling to do so.79 Unless
Nancy’s parents could prove by “clear and convincing evidence” her wish to
terminate her life, the court was not willing to authorize the termination of
treatment.80 Similar to the Quinlan court, the Cruzan court recognized an
individual’s right to privacy to terminate treatment.81 But when that right had not
been expressly claimed by a patient, the right could not be vindicated, unless it could
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be proven by clear and convincing evidence.82 Thus, in Cruzan, the state’s interest in
preserving life prevailed.83
If the Cruzan court rejected the fabricated autonomy of Quinlan, it also failed to
vindicate the patient’s autonomy in any manner at all. Indeed, not only did the court
ignore the affirmative value of autonomy, but it also rejected the libertarian view that
the state ought not interfere in private moral decision-making.84 In Cruzan, the State
of Missouri determined the course of Nancy Cruzan’s treatment.85 Regardless of
whether its decision was “correct,” it violated rather than affirmed the value of
personal autonomy. Once again, the absence of any system for converting moral
views into treatment decisions interfered with patient autonomy.
The fact that Quinlan and Cruzan have opposite outcomes, which are based
solely upon the location in which they took ill, highlights the lack of autonomy in the
system. In a system based on autonomy, the view of the patient is all that matters.
When the makeup of the court determines the outcome, the decision is not
autonomous.
C. Schindler v. Schiavo
While Quinlan pretended to protect personal autonomy by permitting death and
Cruzan pretended to do the opposite, Schiavo presented a new challenge: different
family members competing for the right to express the patient’s autonomy.86 The
facts of Schiavo have by now become familiar to the public: a young woman
unexpectedly left comatose, with only a few oral statements about how she would
like to be treated.87 In Schiavo, however, the family members themselves disputed
what Terry Schiavo would have intended.88
The Florida Supreme Court continued to use the language of autonomy,
explaining that, “in the end, this case is not about the aspirations that loving parents
have for their children. It is about Theresa Schiavo’s right to make her own decision,
independent of her parents and independent of her husband.”89 Just as in Quinlan
and Cruzan, the court here had no real knowledge of what Terry Schiavo would have
done.90 As the court freely acknowledged, the trial court considered evidence of
Terry’s values, personality, and her own decision-making process before making her
decision for her.91
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Schiavo is essentially a liberal response to the Cruzan decision. Faced with the
possibility that “clear and convincing” proof would be required, the court simply
held that such proof of Terry’s wishes existed.92 The fact that no more evidence of
her intent existed than had existed in either of the other two cases again highlights
that personal autonomy played no role in the outcome.
The Schiavo court recognized the deeply flawed nature of the process. As the
court described it, “[i]t may be unfortunate . . . that the best forum we can provide is
a judge with no prior knowledge of the ward, but the law provides no better solution
that adequately protects the interests in promoting the value of life.”93 Once again
the absence of a mediating influence that could convert moral values into treatment
decisions resulted in a denial of personal autonomy. But perhaps we can do better.
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: FORMALIZING SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT AND BEST
INTERESTS
State legislatures have responded to the challenges posed by incapacitated
patients by developing legal processes to govern decision-making. One such process
maintains a focus on personal autonomy—the living will.94 Others rely on family
members to make decisions for incapacitated patients, whether through substituted
judgment or a best interest test.95
Living wills are documents signed by patients, which formalize their intentions.
Living wills became popular in the aftermath of Quinlan. More than forty states
have adopted living will statutes that permit competent adults to declare by advance
directive that they do not wish to be kept alive by medical treatment in the latter
stages of a terminal illness.96 Living wills are an exceptionally blunt instrument for
dealing with end-of-life decision-making. Perhaps for that reason, they are typically
viewed not as a means of directing treatment, but as a means of authorizing a patient
to direct that some treatments not be provided.97
While living wills are accepted throughout the United States, some states
promote the health care proxy as the primary planning tool.98 In the event of
incapacity, a health care proxy empowers someone else to be a person’s agent and to
make health care decisions for him.99 Agents are directed to make decisions in
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accordance with the wishes of their principals. If those wishes are unknown and
cannot be determined with a reasonable effort, the agent may use his own judgment
and make decisions in his principal’s best interest.100 The health care proxy
document itself may provide for the agency relationship to terminate upon some
event.101
Lately, some state legislatures have authorized family members or close friends
to make decisions and in some cases have established a hierarchy of decision-makers
within families.102 In most cases, decisions are to be made based on substituted
judgment, in which family members try to make the decision that the incapacitated
patient would have made.103 In some cases, a best interest test may be employed,
which the family member simply decides on the basis of what he or she thinks is in
the patient’s best interest.104
These approaches have three identifiable flaws. First, legislative efforts to have
patients express their wishes through formalized legal documents have been
unsuccessful; only one in four patients has executed an advance directive.105 This
fact remains true despite the mandate that the federal government imposed requiring
that patients be advised of their rights to execute advance directives upon admission
to the hospital.106 Thus, this legislative effort fails because it is simply not utilized by
patients.
Second, these legislative efforts have left patients and their families dissatisfied
with the end-of-life process. A systematic review of the evidence conducted by the
Agency for Health Care Quality and Research concluded that only thin and
100
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equivocal evidence supports the conclusion that improved, advance care planning
actually improves the experience for patients and their families.107
Finally, other than in the case of living wills, all of these processes involve
empowering persons other than the patient to make decisions on the patient’s behalf.
In some cases, family members are empowered to make decisions based on what
they believe that patient would have preferred. In others, they are permitted to
decide what is in the best interest of the patient. Even when patients state their
preferences by executing a living will (or otherwise), serious questions arise as to
whether physicians are even aware of their patients’ preferences. One study has
found that the use of specific advanced directives, such as living wills, had no
measurable effect on end-of-life care.108
V. TOWARDS TRUE AUTONOMY
As described above, despite widespread agreement that personal autonomy
should govern end-of-life decisions, courts, legislatures, and family members
regularly make decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients. This result is not
entirely unexpected; the patient who has lost capacity to make decisions cannot
currently be autonomous. Because the patient is not currently autonomous,
substituted judgment and best interest serve at least the purpose of excluding the
State from decisions it may not be competent to make. Having one’s mother,
brother, spouse, or partner make the most important decisions about one’s life is
certainly better than entrusting the decision to the state legislature or the whim of an
uninformed treating physician. None of these options, however, can be said to
vindicate a person’s interest in personal autonomy.
One key to advancing autonomous end-of-life decision-making for patients
without decisional capacity may lie in better understanding the nature of the decision
that must be made. When patients still have decisional capacity, their autonomy is
expressed as a treatment decision. For example, when patients are told that they
have cancer, pneumonia, and an infection, doctors ask them to determine which
treatment they wish to undergo: chemotherapy, artificial respiration, or antibiotics?
Patients can express their moral views through a treatment decision. When patients
cannot make their own treatment decisions, however, they still have the right to have
their moral decisions converted to reality by a neutral and disinterested professional
whose sole duty is to their patients. Those professionals are the patients’ doctors.
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Doctors and their patients enter a relationship that creates a responsibility to
respond to medical reality.109 Doctors, as part of their duties to obtain informed
consent110 and their obligation towards patient autonomy, need to obtain express
ethical guidelines from their patients that is sufficient to make all treatment
decisions. Patients need to make those ethical decisions, and then, if they cannot
make treatment decisions, to rely upon their chosen doctors to make informed
medical choices. And families need to be left alone to assume their rightful role as
supportive and loving caretakers and not be called upon to determine when their
loved ones should live or die.
Identifying appropriate parameters for patient autonomy and explicitly
recognizing the relationship patients enter with doctors can help create a system of
dying that imposes far less on innocent family members as life draws to a close.
Patients themselves would be responsible for identifying the values that would
govern decisions about their bodies. Medical personnel would be responsible for
implementing those decisions. And families, the real victims of today’s non-system,
would be freed of the burden of determining whether and when loved ones would
live or die.
A system in which physicians are required to learn their patients’ moral
preferences, and then to make treatment decisions for them when they are
incapacitated has a number of advantages. First, it would help vindicate personal
autonomy. For example, in each of the three seminal cases described above, the
patient had a generalized moral view of end-of-life issues. But their views had never
been developed or properly expressed. By emphasizing the role of doctors to
convert moral decisions into treatment decision, we create a locus of responsibility
for having patients express their views in a time and manner that can definitively
lead to treatment decisions.
In addition, such a system would instigate the creation of a science to end-of-life
decision-making. Because decision-making now is focused on the family, no
standards have evolved to help evaluate the decision-making process. Returning the
medical profession to the end-of-life treatment arena will ensure that methods will
evolve for translating moral decisions into treatment decisions. As these methods
crystallize, the moral choices will become clearer as well, because categories of
treatment will evolve that enable patients to better understand how their moral views
will be converted to reality.
This system would also be compatible with the skills and interests of patients.
The process of becoming so ill that one is incapacitated to the point of death is
transformative; it may be impossible for a person truly to project a decision into the
future that represents his or her real moral view.111 This appears to have been the
109
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justification for courts to ignore the weakly expressed wishes of Karen Quinlan and
Nancy Cruzan and impose their own utilitarian views upon these women. By
strengthening patients’ ability to express clear moral views, while reducing the
expectation that they can anticipate how they would make treatment decisions, the
process can be clarified, allowing more patients to take control over their care.
Certainly, creating a new paradigm would require addressing an entirely new
system of pressures. A new paradigm would require doctors and patients to reinvest
in a closer and more personal relationship, a worthwhile goal in any event, but
difficult to achieve in today’s specialist-oriented system. Physicians with moral
objections to preferences expressed by patients would need to be accommodated.
Some monitoring would need to be undertaken to ensure that utilitarian values,
especially financial considerations, do not infringe on autonomy. At the same time,
additional medical malpractice costs would need to be avoided. These pressures are
not insurmountable, however, and are worth addressing to advance a better end-oflife decision-making process.
Vesting treatment decisions with doctors while reserving moral decisions to
patients may seem pathbreaking, but it is in fact merely a variation of an early court
opinion in this area. In a fascinating if now-forgotten chapter of the Quinlan case,
the New Jersey Chancery Court, a lower court that heard testimony on the case,
proposed that the courts defer to physicians in end-of-life situation.112
That lower court initially declined to grant to Karen’s father the authority to
terminate her treatment.113 The court first held that since Karen had never
specifically decided that she wished to die in these circumstances, the decision of
when to terminate Karen’s treatment was a medical question and not a judicial
one.114 Family members were too personally involved to make a decision, and the
courts would not interfere with a treatment decision.115 The decision was to be made
by her doctors.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, the lower court’s conclusion that
the ultimate decision was medical, not judicial was clearly misguided; it is for the
courts ultimately to adjudicate these issues.116 The court’s recognition of the unique
role to be played by physicians, however, contains a critical understanding.
Physicians do have a unique role to play in end-of-life decisions. The role is not to
decide for the patient, but it is to find a way to provide treatment that comports with
the patient’s wishes.
The doctor-patient relationship affords a unique opportunity to learn the patient’s
views in a neutral setting. Once those views are known, a physician is in a unique
position to convert those views into actual treatment decisions. Unlike family and
other bystanders, physicians are moral actors in the end-of-life saga; they must treat
five? It is not merely that at age twelve she is incapable of deciding, but also that at age
twelve she is incapable of understanding what the choice will be when she reaches more
advanced ages.
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or not treat their patients. Placing responsibility in the hands of those with a real and
moral role would re-invigorate the personal autonomy interest. To the extent that
our legal system is aligned with this reality, it will both improve personal autonomy
and relieve families from the unfair burden of making end-of-life treatment decisions
they are not equipped to make.117
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Ray D. Madoff, Autonomy and End-of-Life Decision Making: Reflections of a Lawyer
and a Daughter, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 936 (2005). Ray Madoff, a professor at Boston College
Law School, spends much of her time teaching about end-of-life decisions. Id. When her
father became ill, she discovered the vast gulf between the world of law and the world of
reality. Id. She discovered that a sympathetic and caring doctor was able to guide her family
through end-of-life treatment decisions that, while not strictly complying with her father’s
health care proxy, was sympathetic to the needs of all involved. Id. Madoff concludes that
her personal experience was that “the law” did not work very well in the real world, where
doctors needed to work towards the best result, not one bound up on paper decisions. Id.
Perhaps, she mused, this is the best system we can get. Id.
But, perhaps not. So long as we exclude physicians from the responsibility of discerning
their patients’ wills and, then, converting them to real-life treatment decisions, our laws and
our reality will continue to clash at the cost of personal autonomy and family peace.

